A robust anti-terror doctrine has to take into consideration that almost 99 per cent of anti-India operations are planned in India’s near abroad
If the notion of doctrine — in the discourse of state action — were to lend itself to holistic appraisal, then it would not emerge merely as a belief system that is established on the basis of authority. A state-sponsored doctrine comes to the fore when there is a correct understanding of the universe of discourse in which a State stations itself, its perception of threat to the discourse, which propels it to continued nationhood, and a clearly defined manner in which it seeks to both fortify itself and respond to threat.
Indeed, the search for a doctrine essentially begins with a correct understanding of the paradigm in which a state or a system seeks to situate itself. Such an understanding could stem from the examination of a number of aspects, including a State-system’s distinctive spirit, ethical values, the relationship between the governance and the governed and how it perceives renegade conduct, anti-state action and external aggression. If a doctrine is normally accepted as authoritative, and as a principle that may not be questioned, then the reason behind such a consideration would be that the doctrine was arrived at after great deliberation.
If the combat doctrine of the Indian Army, for instance — in its broadest contour — is based on holding formations and strike formations, then it exhibits a philosophy based on tactical consideration that has been arrived at after considerable thought and experimentation. India has been to war on five occasions, and although each time witnessed a different nature of warfare, the fact of the matter is that the Indian Army (as must be the case with the other two arms of the Indian armed forces) had the opportunity to test and develop its doctrine.
A doctrine can, therefore, mature, while adhering to a broad set of beliefs. In other words, although the tactical considerations of a doctrine may receive newer insights, and consequently undergo calibration, the broad parameters would not change unless a paradigm shift occurs. Paradigm shift (by way of illustration) in an extra-Indian geopolitical context would include the break-up of Pakistan in 1971 and the Soviet Union in 1991. The loss of the eastern wing would have necessitated the establishment of a new security doctrine for Pakistan (if indeed, it sought such an articulation), as would be the case with Russia after the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States from among the states of the former Soviet Union.
In any event, India cannot afford to continue with ambiguities on the counter-terrorism front. The absence of a well-thought-out anti-terror doctrine for India, especially as it is one of the most terror-distressed nation, is a noteworthy shortcoming, one that has led to a great deal of uncertainty. Indeed, the question which needs to be asked at this juncture is why has India not anvilled an anti-terrorism doctrine. Is it because it continues to grope around for a comprehensive definition of what constitutes terror? Or, is it because its unique belief system deliberately wants a flexible anti-terrorism policy? Or, has it, in the face of inability to formulate a flexible policy, kept clear of any doctrine formulation whatsoever?
The dilemma that India is faced with also stems from the fact that there exists a non-articulated perception in policymaking circles that there is an inherent distinction between ethnic militancy such as NSCN, ULFA and PLA (M) on the one hand, and Islamist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba on the other. Indeed, this is so despite the fact that (at times) the activities of groups such as PLA (M) — as in the 13 November 2021 Churachandpur ambush — had approximated that of a group like Lashkar-e-Taiba. If such features of Indian officialdom are any indication, then policy planners of the country do not seem to be suffering from a crisis of definition. It is quite clear in its understanding of the meaning of terrorism. Indeed, in the opinion of the author, it is in fact such an understanding that has led not only to the ambivalence that characterises India’s response to terror but the non-articulated perception of what constitutes terrorism.
If terrorism is defined by the act (as aforesaid), then even the carnage at Dhemaji in Assam on 15 August 2004, when ULFA reportedly triggered off an explosion killing 13 people including innocent women and children, should have been enough to deal with ULFA in the manner of a terrorist organisation. But New Delhi has not only not done so, but is presently taking active steps to hold dialogue with the very people who were responsible for the act. What could be the reason for this? Is it because New Delhi considers the Dhemaji incident as an uncharacteristic ULFA behaviour, an act that occurred without premeditation, or an accident for which the organisation has reportedly repented? Or, are there other considerations for which a political engagement with ULFA, in the present circumstances, makes sense?
It is also possible that the non-articulated distinction, which Indian policymakers might be making between ethnic militancy like ULFA and Islamist groups such as Jaish-e-Mohammad, could well have been egged on by the fact that the Indian experience with ethnic militancy has not been altogether negative. Ethnic militant groups such as Mizo National Front have returned to the Indian constitutional process, and groups such as NSCN (IM) are engaged in a dialogue process with New Delhi. The ULFA’s show of interest in a negotiated settlement (albeit, this time around from a position of relative weakness) appeals to New Delhi’s present bout of magnanimity, and although the organisation’s pro-talk faction no longer holds onto the issue of “sovereignty,” it is certain that its charter of demands would have conditions that must ascertain the group’s honourable exit, aspects that New Delhi may find difficult to accept.
But non-acceptance of such demands would result in a stalemate, and there would be criticism that another NSCN (IM) is being created, whereby an insurgent group is being sought to be penned by protracted dialogue. It is also possible that New Delhi feels that an insurgent organisation having come over ground would taste the “dividends of peace,” and find it difficult to return to its earlier Spartan existence. This may be a fine strategy, but certainly one which only has short term gains.
Although the cross-border terrorist phenomenon has always afflicted India, the belligerence with which it has begun to array itself in the aftermath of 11 September 2001 has brought into question India’s relationship with its immediate neighbours. If earlier Pakistan was the only neighbour that aided and perpetrated acts of terror against India, the “eastward surge of the Islamist” (especially in the aftermath of Operation Inherent Resolve and the ouster of the ISIS from Syria and Iraq) has included nations like Bangladesh into the club of “near abroad terror sustainers,” however non-official in its ambit. Furthermore, there are reports that China has re-entered the North East insurgency game.
A robust anti-terror doctrine has to take into consideration that almost 99 percent of anti-India operations are planned in India’s near abroad. While Islamist action constitutes the primal danger to India’s security, anti-India operations that are being carried out by UNLF, PLA (M), KPLT, ULFA (I), etc, and ones that are being chaperoned by both Pakistan and China should be on India’s anti-terror radar as well. After all, would not linkages with anti-India forces such as ISI-MSS-DGFI qualify, say, the Paresh Baruah faction of ULFA and Manipur’s PLA as terrorist organisations?
The author is a conflict analyst and author of several best-selling books on security and strategy. Views expressed are personal.
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