Surfacing of incompatible interests on the European theatre has forced both administrations to walk the extra mile and double down on Indo-Pacific partnership
External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar’s riposte to the United States on ‘human rights’ is making headlines in India, but it overshadows the other reality that became evident this week as Jaishankar and his Cabinet colleague defence minister Rajnath Singh concluded their two-day trip to the US — despite the challenges posed by the Ukraine war and the destabilizing effect this has caused to bilateral ties, both nations haven’t stopped betting on each other.
In a curious way, the surfacing of incompatible interests in the European theatre seems to have forced both administrations to walk the extra mile and double down on the Indo-Pacific partnership and more, resulting in a galvanizing effect on overall bilateral ties.
This is an important takeaway because the Russian invasion of Ukraine intensified notes of discord in the most consequential relationship of the 21st century — a belief shared by both sides — and widened some hairline fractures into visible gaps.
This writer on previous occasions has highlighted how these gaps were roiling the India-US relationship and presenting China with a chance to drive a wedge between the strategic partners.
However, as Jaishankar and Singh’s visit to the US for 2+2 talks and the Joe Biden-Narendra Modi virtual meeting showed, throbbing, cacophonous democracies can remain cognizant of the larger picture and pursue long-term strategic interests despite a thousand near-term distractions and the tyranny of recency.
And there were/are distractions galore. As Jaishankar noted during a presser on Wednesday, India’s stance on Ukraine enjoys deeper understanding within the Biden administration and among people in policy positions, but the public narrative is “very, very different” and “there is a gap in between the policy and the narrative”.
Quite often the public narrative takes precedence over nuanced policy positions and facts, creating negative perception and driving up temperatures. For instance, during the White House background briefing ahead of Modi-Biden virtual talks, the media interest was stubbornly focused on India’s buying of Russian oil, an amount too puny to even merit a mention in list of countries that import the most.
During the post 2+2 presser in Washington, when needled by a reporter on India’s purchases of Russian energy that remains a fraction of Europe’s daily diet, Jaishankar quipped: “We do buy some energy which is necessary for our energy security. But I suspect, looking at the figures, probably our total purchases for the month would be less than what Europe does in an afternoon.”
Along with media speculation, provocative statements made by US officials have also added to the cacophony, so much so that the external affairs minister himself in presence of UK foreign secretary Liz Truss, hit out at a “campaign” against India.
While instances of anti-Americanism and anti-Indianism dominate public discourse, the recent engagements showed that Washington and New Delhi are putting in some robust work to not let the relationship drift and meet emerging challenges head-on — with a tacit understanding that some differences are intrinsic and irreconcilable but these will have to be accommodated and managed in view of the larger goal — the threat posed by China.
Jaishankar may claim that Biden administration is “well informed” and know where “India is coming from”. As a seasoned diplomat and a foreign minister in the middle of a trip that has gone swimmingly, he would know a thing or two about signalling. However, it is also true that several high and mid-ranking American officials, including the White House press secretary, have piled on coercive pressure at various times to shape India’s behaviour and choices. Not to speak of US lawmakers whose criticisms have frequently been quite severe.
The contradictory messages that were emerging from Washington weren’t necessarily steeped in animus towards India, but indicative of a larger tension within the Biden administration between the idealists and the pragmatists on Ukraine war. On India, it was accompanied by a disappointment from the idealists who wanted India to support the American cause because we are a democracy and a member of the Quad, and the arguments tended to be on moral lines without any consideration for India’s strategic interests.
This makes the 2+2 deliverables even more significant. The spirit of accommodation that emerged from the interaction and engagements — a momentum that was set by Biden and Modi during their virtual meet — hinted that within the American side (not so much New Delhi that remained steadfast on strategic autonomy) the pragmatists have won the debate.
The differences have not ceased to exist. But the bonhomie on display indicates a mainstreaming of the view in Washington that India’s ambitions and strategic interests may not always match with those that of the US, and in such cases, little can be gained by applying coercive tactics. In fact, putting pressure to shape India’s behaviour is not worth the diplomatic effort and even counterproductive. A measured response is likely to be more effective, more so because the natural trajectory of India-Russia ties is headed towards a zone that is more comfortable for Americans, and the war has created realities that may force India to make choices that are better aligned to American interests.
Therefore, when asked about whether it is “problematic” that “India is yet to condemn Russian invasion even after 48 days”, US secretary of state Antony Blinken said at the presser that “India has made very strong statements in New York at the UN, the minister, before the Indian parliament, condemning the killing of civilians in Ukraine, calling for an independent investigation of these atrocities. And I would also note that India is providing significant humanitarian assistance to the people of Ukraine, notably medicines, which are very necessary and in real demand.” He also admitted that “India’s relationship with Russia has developed over decades at a time when the United States was not able to be a partner to India.”
The Modi government remained quite bullish about bilateral ties even when subjected to censorious remarks over its position on Ukraine. So, it isn’t a surprise to note the foreign minister pointing out at a presser to mark the end of the trip that India-US relationship has enough strength and comfort to bear the differences. Jaishankar also highlighted a point not always acknowledged, that there has been a “huge change” in relationship that “really allows us to do much more with each other and engage each other in a much different way than we would have done 10 years ago or 20 years ago.”
Also worth noting Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s remarks to Hindustan Times where he said, “India will be very careful to ensure that US core national interests are not affected adversely due to our relations with another country.”
The strength of the ties or spirit of adjustment won’t mean, however, that India bends over backwards to accommodate dubious narratives spawned by various lobby and interest groups within the US. The release of the ‘the annual Country Reports on Human Rights’ by the US State Department coincided with Jaishankar and Singh’s trip to the US, and Blinken referred to it unprovoked during the post 2+2 joint presser, saying that Washington is “monitoring some recent concerning developments in India, including a rise in human rights abuses by some government, police, and prison officials.”
Though he remained silent on that occasion, a day after Jaishankar pushed back, saying that “people are entitled to have views about us. But we are also equally entitled to have views about their views and about the interests, and the lobbies and the vote banks which drive that. So, whenever there is a discussion, I can tell you that we will not be reticent about speaking out.”
Attributing the American crusade over “human rights” to lobbying and vote bank politics, Jaishankar turned the table, referring to a spate of recent hate crimes against Sikhs in the US. “I would tell you that we also take our views on other people’s human rights situation, including that of the United States. So, we take up a human rights issues when they arise in this country, especially when they pertain to our community. And in fact, we had a case yesterday “that’s really where we stand on that.”
The message being sent out is that while India remains committed to the relationship, it has zero tolerance for dubious narratives that are sometimes used as policy tools. It is equally clear that despite differences, some of which came under the spotlight and received outsized exposure due to the Ukraine war, ties are moving ahead led by administrations that recognize the fact that differences in one theatre cannot be allowed to derail ties in another, more consequential theatre.
As former national security advisor Shivshankar Menon says in Foreign Policy, the “India-US relationship is much more robust than people seem to give it credit for. It’s not going to be determined by what happens in Ukraine. This is a relationship that has survived pretty drastic changes of government in both countries. And that’s because the relationship is based on a congruence of interests. We like to stress common principles and democratic values, but it’s the solid basis of common interests that we have continuously built up that drives the relationship.”
This “congruence of interests” between India and the US played out this week in three fundamental ways.
One, it was notable how broad-based engagements were carried out throughout the entire gamut of the relationship at so many levels, over a multitude of domains with various wings of the Biden administration.
While Modi held a virtual summit with Biden (ostensibly at the behest of the White House), foreign minister Jaishankar along with defence minister Singh attended the 2+2 dialogue with their respective delegations. Jaishankar also met Blinken separately in a bilateral, accompanied the US secretary of state to Howard University as part of a US-India dialogue on higher education, and had a meeting with US trade representative (USTR) Katherine Tai and her deputy Sarah Bianchi to take stock of current developments in bilateral trade ties.
Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, along with the 2+2, had a bilateral with US secretary of defence Lloyd Austin, where the “two defence ministers reviewed the entire gamut of bilateral defence cooperation and the regional security situation”, “reviewed military-to-military engagements, information sharing, enhanced logistics cooperation” and also “discussed ways for closer collaboration between defence industries.”
The Ukraine war has put a question mark on Russia’s ability to remain a reliable supplier of weapons systems, military hardware and spare parts on which India remains critically dependent. In that context, the defence minister also held a meeting with senior executives of US aerospace and defence majors Boeing and Raytheon and urged them to “take advantage of policy initiatives in India” to invest and ‘Make in India’ for the world.
Singh also visited the USINDOPACOM headquarters, Pacific Fleet and the training facilities in Hawaii. As a readout stated, “The USINDOPACOM and Indian military have wide-ranging engagements, including a number of military exercises, training events and exchanges.”
The gamut, breadth, depth and intensity of the engagement indicates the effort both sides have put in to ostensibly arrest and overcome incongruencies and reinforce areas of convergence.
Towards that end, the second thing worth noting is the clear signal sent by India that while it won’t be pushed around by the US or anyone in sticking to its strategic interests, the US remains unequivocally its preferred partner. Prime minister Modi told Biden that as we celebrate the 75th anniversary of our diplomatic ties, “I am confident that friendship with the US will remain an integral part of India’s development journey over the next 25 years.”
He also made references to Bucha killings as “very worrying”, said that “success of the partnership between India and the US is the best way to realize the slogan, Democracies can Deliver’ and called the situation in Ukraine, “very worrisome”. This was India catering to American sensibilities.
Jaishankar, for his part, stressed on the $160 billion trade account, 200,000 students, highest-recorded investment levels and rapidly growing energy trade as the yardsticks to measure growing closeness.
The defence minister highlighted the results of extensive engagement on a range of “bilateral, defence and global issues”, that include Space Situational Awareness Agreement, dialogues on AI, India’s decision to join the Bahrain-based multilateral Combined Maritime Force (CMF), implementation of COMCASA, BECA, and “further cooperation in the fields of defence, cyber, special forces, and expanding the scope of logistics cooperation under LEMOA and during joint exercises.”
For his part, US defence secretary Austin referred to the threat China poses to the shared vision of Indo-Pacific, highlighted the way the “Chinese are constructing dual-use infrastructure along its border with India” and said the “United States stands with India in defending their sovereign interests.” The Ukraine war has brought out the dependence of India on Russian military system and spare parts, and a fair bit of Austin’s statement focused on “information-sharing partnership across all warfighting domains”, growing “defense trade and technology cooperation” and launching of “new supply chain cooperation measures that will let us more swiftly support each other’s priority defense requirements.”
That it is a far better strategy to aid India in modernizing its equipment and help diversifying its military hardware portfolio is an argument seemingly gaining ground in the US. At a briefing by the Pentagon press secretary post 2+2 talks, John Kirby said “we have an important defense partnership with India and we are committed to India’s modernization needs, their efforts to build, and to field a more modern military, we’re committed to helping them do that.”
Alongside, we should also note movements on the economic front. One of the biggest weaknesses of US Indo-Pacific strategy, that also impacts groupings such as Quad, is America’s inability to provide alternatives to the states reliant on Chinese capital and investments. A frequent refrain even among Indian officials is that the Indo-Pacific economic framework, far from focusing on connectivity, is a wishy-washy concept that struggles to take off from the ground. It is interesting to note that the meeting between EAM Jaishankar and USTR Tai also referred to Biden’s initiative to launch an Indo-Pacific Economic Framework “aimed at strengthening regional economic cooperation in critical areas such as supply chain resilience.”
The third indicator of congruence was the joint statement that encapsulated the synergies, signalings, visible softening of stances and a pragmatist view of ties. The absence of Russia in the statement, and just one oblique reference to the Ukraine war in a document which stressed on “worsening humanitarian crisis” and “immediate cessation of hostilities” in language that mirrored India’ stance on Ukraine, indicate that the US is wiling to “incorporate the outlook of great powers like India into its thinking”, as Walter Russell Mead writes in Wall Street Journal.
This isn’t to say that the 2+2 talks portrayed US-India relationship as a one-way street where India or its diplomacy has “triumphed”. Rather it shows that pragmatism has persisted and won the day over idealism. A bilateral relationship that remains aware of both sides’ expectations from each other and limitations thereof, is a more stable one.
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