If New Delhi is forced to adopt such a painful tightrope walk to maintain strategic autonomy, then it is no strategic autonomy at all
On Wednesday, India once again abstained from voting in the UN General Assembly on a resolution that deplored “in the strongest terms Russia’s aggression against Ukraine” and called on Moscow to “immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognized borders.” While the resolution — adopted by 141 countries with five voting against and another 35 abstaining — is not legally binding, it is nevertheless a measure of Russia’s isolation in the world body that it could get support from only Belarus, North Korea, Eritrea and Syria to vote against.
This was India’s third abstention in a week. At the 15-nation UN Security Council last Friday, India had abstained along with China and the UAE, and insisted on dialogue as the only way out and regretted that “path of diplomacy was given up”. In its explanation, India had underscored that it is “deeply concerned about the welfare and security of the Indian community, including a large number of Indian students, in Ukraine.”
India has already suffered a casualty in the war with a fourth-year Indian medical student, 21-year-old Naveen SG from Karnataka, getting killed on Tuesday in Kharkiv city while on a short trip from his bunker to bring provisions. Even as the 11th UNGA special session to deplore and condemn Russian actions was underway in New York, also on Wednesday the Russian army was advancing in Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city and home to several medical colleges where many Indian students are still stuck. Amid reports that Russian paratroopers were storming Kharkiv after it was softened up by relentless missile attacks, it emerged that India has managed to secure a safe passage of all Indians from the war-torn city. This is not a mean feat. The Indian embassy in Ukraine released multiple “urgent” advisories to “all Indian nationals in Kharkiv” that “for their safety and security they must leave Kharkiv” and proceed to “Pesochin, Bbabaye and Bezlyudovka as soon as possible” and “under all circumstances” by 1600 GMT (9.30 pm) Wednesday.
This advisory was the result of some intense backroom diplomacy by India that involved calling up the Russian and Ukrainian ambassadors and demanding an “urgent safe passage” for Indians stuck in Kharkiv and other war zones. In a foreign ministry briefing on Wednesday evening, spokesperson Arindam Bagchi said: “we have issued this advisory based on inputs that the Russian side has given,” while declining to put a number to the exact count of students still awaiting rescue.
Late on Wednesday, Prime Minister Narendra Modi dialled Russian president Vladimir Putin. It is likely that Modi impressed upon Putin the need for letting Indians leave and the adverse reaction at home that may arise if one more Indian citizen falls prey to violence. According to the Indian readout, “the leaders reviewed the situation in Ukraine, especially in the city of Kharkiv where many Indian students are stuck. They discussed the safe evacuation of the Indian nationals from the conflict areas.”
The Kremlin version of the talks said: “Putin emphasized that every necessary instruction has been issued, and the Russian service members are doing their utmost to ensure the safe evacuation of Indian nationals from the zone of hostilities and their return home.” The released added that “Russia is doing its best to organize the urgent evacuation of a group of Indian students from Kharkov via a humanitarian corridor by the shortest route to Russia.”
The Russian defence ministry also released a separate statement, claiming that Russian “armed forces are ready to take all necessary measures to safely evacuate Indian citizens and send them home from Russian territory on our military transport planes or Indian aircraft, as was suggested by the Indian side.”
Getting the advancing Russians to pause in their tracks, even if momentarily, and Ukrainians busy defending their homeland to make exceptions for Indian students amid the crisis, is a herculean effort and deft diplomacy.
Going by some (albeit unverified) accounts in social media, India’s gambit seemed to have worked. Worth noting that Russia has also promised to launch a “proper investigation” into the death of Indian student Naveen.
The sequence of events is worth recounting because a single day catches in a nutshell India’s dilemma, predicament and the focus of its diplomatic efforts during the Ukraine crisis as it mounts an almighty attempt to evacuate thousands of students still stuck in the conflict zones.
India’s primary objective since the war broke out in Ukraine has been evacuation of its citizens and somehow arranging for a safe passage to achieve that objective amid intense shelling, chaos, humanitarian disaster and even charges of racial discrimination. This found reflection in India’s explanatory note on abstention on Wednesday where India’s permanent ambassador to the UN, TS Tirumurti, opened his statement by saying that India is “deeply concerned over the rapidly deteriorating situation in Ukraine and the ensuing humanitarian crisis” and demanded “safe and uninterrupted passage for all Indian nationals, including our students, who are still stranded in Ukraine, particularly from Kharkiv and other cities in the conflict zones. Many member states share this concern.”
Notably, India pointed out that “we have reiterated this demand to both the Russian Federation and Ukraine. This remains our foremost priority,” in an indication that the fog of war has brought its own set of challenges. The achievement of India’s primary objective, therefore, also required clarity of purpose amid claims and counter claims of an intensifying info-war.
Evidently, despite a sensation Russian claim that Ukraine side is holding some Indian students hostage and a refutation by Ukraine that put the blame on Russians, India’s Ministry of External Affairs was categorical in stating that “we have not received any reports of any hostage situation regarding any student” and noted that “with the cooperation of the Ukrainian authorities, many students have left Kharkiv yesterday.” India is aware that it must bring back a few thousand more of its nationals amid a delicate moment of heightened tensions and sensitivities, and therefore it has appeared to play down reports and accounts of students facing difficulties in boarding trains for evacuation.
Parents hug Iqra Praveen, centre, an Indian student studying in Ukraine who fled the conflict, after she arrived at Indira Gandhi International Airport in New Delhi. AP
Regrettably, there has been scant regard in the West for India’s position and predicament in the Ukraine crisis. A torrent of hyper-moralistic remarks, panic-stricken commentary and even veiled threats has come India’s way where the crisis has been framed in overtly moral terms and India’s abstention has been interpreted as a provincial response from an incapable, third-world country that has abdicated its right to become a global player for the “sin” of prioritizing own interests.
I do not wish to go deep into the hypocrisy, duplicity and vacuous moral bombast from the “normative” West that is cancelling all Russian and even Belarussian artists, sportspersons and even Paralympic athletes for to ‘punish’ Putin. One commentator, Stanford professor Michael McFaul who had been a former US ambassador to Moscow, tweeted and then deleted a post that “there are no more ‘innocent’ ‘neutral’ Russians anymore. Everyone has to make a choice — support or oppose this war.” Piling on the collective guilt, vilifying all Russians is a measure of the distance ‘western liberal democracies’ have travelled.
The strategic community in the West believes their own actions should be guided by self-interest but countries such as India should indulge in morality play during moments of crises ahead of their national interest. The inherent neocolonialism naturally escapes their cognition.
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To be fair, the US government has appeared more circumspect of India’s concerns, views and the unique position that it finds itself in a war which has seen the return of ‘bloc’ politics and it is being asked to choose between two important strategic partners. Ned Price, a US State Department spokesman, has reiterated at a recent news conference that “we share important interests with India. We share important values with India. And we know India has a relationship with Russia that is distinct from the relationship that we have with Russia” and “that’s okay.” The Quad nations, ostensibly to better understand and coordinate their compulsions and responses to the Ukraine crisis, have decided to call for a surprise virtual summit on 3 March. The sudden summit seems to be an attempt to bridge the gap that is evident between India and other members of the Quad.
At a hearing on US-India relations on Wednesday, hours after India had abstained from voting at the UNGA, one of the members the US Senate foreign relations committee said, “India’s the world’s largest democracy. And so I had hoped that India would side with the rest of the world’s democracies in support of Ukraine.”
In another interesting development, American media outlet Axios reported on Thursday that the US state department “has recalled a cable to US diplomats that instructed them to inform counterparts from India and the United Arab Emirates their position of neutrality on Ukraine put them ‘in Russia’s camp’.” According to the report, the cable asks US envoys in these countries to tell their counterparts that “continuing to call for dialogue, as you have been doing in the Security Council, is not a stance of neutrality; it places you in Russia’s camp, the aggressor in this conflict.”
While state department officials claimed that the cable was “never intended for clearance” and “was released in error”, Axios says it may point to a “policy dispute inside the US government involving two key allies.”
There is no doubt whatsoever that India’s ties with the US-led West have reached a fork in the road on the Russia question, and there seems to be a lack of understanding of the context that shapes India’s strategic choices.
India’s quest for a neutral space, that arises from a necessity to balance its interests between Moscow and Washington so that it may hedge against the rise of China (a far more pressing problem for India than a war in Europe) is being held against it as a measure of New Delhi’s unreliability and unworthiness of becoming a democratic partner of the West.
While pointing out the rationale behind India’s stance at the UN, its explanatory notes, diplomatic manoeuvres led by Prime Minister Modi and External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar must also be taken into consideration. Together, India’s handling of the crisis — beyond the compulsions of working with the warring sides to ensure the welfare of its own citizens — indicate a melange of self-interest, pragmatic outlook, a constant weighing of the trade-off between its principles and geopolitical complexities and calibrated shifts arising out of that tension.
India’s entire near-term effort has been predicated on managing, de-escalating or at the very least not actively contributing to the crisis through public naming and shaming of the aggressor. Might Modi have been able to create the space for two telephonic conversations with Putin in quick succession and demand a safe passage for Indian citizens had he gone hammer and tongs after the Russian president at the UN? It is not clear what that performative stance would have achieved except assuaging the West’s bruised ego, but it would have definitely complicated the achievement of India’s primary goal.
Some western commentators, while taking note of this dynamic, have argued that since “New Delhi and Moscow have had friendly ties for decades”, the “former can use the goodwill it has accumulated to quietly pressure Russian President Vladimir Putin into finding a diplomatic, face-saving solution,” as Manjari Chatterjee Miller writes in Foreign Affairs.
By all available evidence, Modi has done exactly that. In a previous phone call to Putin on 24 February, Modi had “appealed for an immediate cessation of violence, and called for concerted efforts from all sides to return to the path of diplomatic negotiations and dialogue.” This ties with India’s belief that dialogue and diplomacy may help achieve objectives better than coercive tactics.
India’s stance on Russia has also been remarkably consistent. It is informed by history, shared concern over unipolarity, strategic culture and an underpinning of mutual trust that, despite the end of Cold War, Russia’s pivot to China and India’s simultaneous pivot to the US, has not yet run its course. In January 1980, for instance, the Indira Gandhi government “virtually endorsed the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan” in a move that was described by the US a “great disappointment” even though, as the Washington Post had reported, “during her election campaign, Gandhi had criticized the Soviet move.”
Cut to 2014, during Russia’s seizing of the Crimean Peninsula. Then Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon had said “Russia has ‘legitimate’ interests there and they should be discussed to find a satisfactory solution to the issue.” India also feels obligated by the fact that at least on six previous occasions, Russia has used its veto power at the UN Security Council on resolutions targeting India on issues such as Goa and Kashmir.
Between this give and take of history, India’s domestic political alignment is also worth noting. Congress, the chief Opposition, has criticized government’s handling of the evacuation but on Russia policy, Congress’ stance mirrors that of the government at the UN.
The West has also shown inability to understand how India’s concerns over China continues to shape its Russia policy. New Delhi’s apprehension of a growing Russia-China entente, that already has been proclaimed as “no limits” by Xi Jinping and Putin, is only going to get more acute with the realization that western sanctions on Russia will further tilt Moscow towards Beijing. That leaves India in a precarious spot, surrounded by hostile actors in a tough region. If Russia is added to the China-Pakistan axis, and there is every indication of that happening, then it is imperative for India not to shut the diplomatic door on Russia. India may not be able to arrest the geopolitical trend of a growing China-Russia-Pakistan axis at its doorstep, but it may be able to retain a friendly ear in Moscow.
On India’s necessity to do so, Professor Happymon Jaob writes in The Hindu, “New Delhi needs Moscow’s assistance to manage its continental difficulties be it through defence supplies, helping it ‘return’ to central Asia, working together at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) or exploring opportunities for collaboration in Afghanistan. Russia, to put it rather bluntly, is perhaps India’s only partner of consequence in the entire Asian continental stretch.”
Finally, India’s arms dependence on Russia guiding its strategic imperatives has been done to death.
Some analysts have argued, pointing at recent trends, that India’s dependence on Russian arms is steadily declining and it may not be an adequate explanation of India’s voting patterns at the UN. A 2021 SIPRI report reveals “arms exports by Russia, which accounted for 20 per cent of all exports of major arms in 2016-20, dropped by 22 per cent (to roughly the same level as in 2006-10). The bulk–around 90 per cent–of this decrease was attributable to a 53 per cent fall in its arms exports to India.”
The question of whether Russia has more leverage over India or vice-versa, it not just academic. It goes to the heart of the dependence equation. Worth noting that despite the notable decline in arms purchases, Russia remains the only vendor willing to sell advance military equipment such as S-400 missile defence systems and share technology with India which is eager to develop its own defence manufacturing industry.
As Yogesh Joshi, research fellow, Institute of South Asian Studies, points out, “Russian assistance has been vital in India’s nuclear submarine programme and the development of the BrahMos cruise missile. Moreover, the Russian S-400 air defence system is critical for India in future contests with China and Pakistan. Heavily isolated, crossing Putin may fundamentally upset India’s military readiness, especially when confronting a potent and aggressive adversary on its northern frontier.”
It is also difficult to overnight introduce a radical change in a legacy system built around Russian military equipment. So, while India sets about reorganizing its military system, building own capabilities and reorienting its armed forces, it can ill afford to completely antagonize Russia.
This ought to be a sufficient explanation for India’s voting pattern at the UN, unless the argument is that India should let go of its self-interest and align itself to West’s morality play at the stage which has been described by Syed Akbaruddin as “sacred drama.”
However, while India’s stance so far on Russia has been backed by pragmatism and realpolitik, New Delhi needs to take a long, hard a look at its long-term Russia policy. Strategic autonomy, on which India puts such a high premium, that forced New Delhi to adopt such a painful tightrope walk, is no strategic autonomy at all if it can’t be exercised in self-interest.
As a middle power, India’s focus at this stage of its rise is to create conditions favourable for its rise. To refer to foreign minister Jaishankar’s book, The India Way: Strategies for an Uncertain World, New Delhi’s goal therefore is to advance its “national interests by identifying and exploiting opportunities created by global contradictions”… “to extract as much gains from as many ties as possible”. And since the rise of China poses a significantly difficult challenge for India, New Delhi must leverage “the external environment to address [these] bilateral imbalances”.
While India needs to take the edge off the trade-offs that are required to pursue such a policy — maintaining simultaneously close ties with Washington and Moscow with an eye on balancing against its primacy adversary, China — these trade-offs will become increasingly unsustainable if India finds itself on the wrong side of history, having to back a rogue actor bent on a revanchist quest to rearrange Europe’s security order through use of force.
The very reasons why India in the short to medium term cannot antagonize Russia, are the same reasons why it should break free of this dependence in the long run. Leveraging the great power politics while it does so will be India’s most pressing challenge.
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